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5.1  Multiculturalism in Northeast Asia
Multiculturalism emerged as a discourse and policy of managing ethnic and cultural 
diversity in the 1970s. It was regarded as a more liberal and democratic alterna-
tive to the assimilation model in race and ethnic relations (Kymlicka 2010). It met, 
however, a backlash in the mid-1990s as Western Europeans tend to believe that 
multiculturalism separated rather than integrated immigrants and ethnic minorities 
into a mainstream society and prevented them from having a sense of identity and 
responsibility as members of society (Joppke 2010). The fear that accommodation 
of diversity has gone too far and is threatening the majority group’s way of life gave 
rise to nativist rightwing political movements in the Netherlands, France, and the 
UK (Back et al. 2002; Entzinger 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005). Political leaders of 
France, Germany, and Britain continuously declared the failure or the end of multi-
culturalism in their own countries.
While multiculturalism lost popular support in Europe, it gained public interest 
and policy attention in Northeast Asia, particularly in South Korea since the 1990s. 
The rapid increase of immigrants and the urgent need for accommodating new mem-
bers of society and helping them integrate into mainstream society were the main 
reasons for the sudden interest in multiculturalism. Although structural changes that 
brought about racial and ethnic diversity in a society and the urgency of policy in-
tervention to solve immigration-related problems are similar in Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan, the three countries have shown different paces, breadths, and directions of 
policy reforms. If Korea has taken proactive and broad-spectrum measures to re-
spond to the rise of a multicultural society, Japan has basically maintained the status 
quo while making only minor reforms and engaging in local grassroots movements. 
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In terms of scale of societal responsiveness, Taiwan seems to be closer to Korea 
than to Japan. Also, because of unique historical legacies, ethnic  composition, polit-
ical leadership structures, and relationships between the state and civil society, each 
country has developed distinct features of multiculturalism discourse and policy.
Japan has long been a multi-ethnic society because it has had distinct ethnic mi-
nority groups for a long period of time (Lie 2001; Weiner 1997). Multiculturalism 
has not been discussed in the past, however, and began to arise as a political ideol-
ogy only after the mid-1990s when there was a felt need to respond to the growing 
visibility of migrants in Japanese society (Burgess 1997; Yamanaka 2010). Japan 
began to admit foreign migrant workers in the 1980s and other types of immigrants 
such as marriage migrants and foreign students joined the wave of immigration. 
As of 2010, the number of registered immigrants was 2,212,639, accounting for 
1.8 % of the total population. Among the foreigners are Brazilians and Peruvians of 
Japanese descent called Nikkeijins invited to work in Japan and tens of thousands 
of Vietnamese refugees. There are also significant numbers of foreign businessmen 
and their families, English teachers, and foreign students (Hays 2013). The largest 
group of foreigners is the Chinese, who surpassed the Koreans for the Number 1 
spot in 2007 and accounted for 32.2 % of the foreign population. The next larg-
est minority groups are the Koreans (26.5 %) and the Brazilians (10.5 %). Migrant 
workers totaled 650,000 in 2010, constituting 1.0 % of the total labor force. The 
cumulative number of female marriage migrants was estimated at 195,994 in 2005 
and international marriages account for about 5–6 % of all marriages in Japan.
The Japanese government responded to immigration-related problems by adopt-
ing a ‘multicultural coexistence’ policy in 2005 (Kim et al. 2008, p. 166). In the 
following year, it announced the implementation plan for multicultural coexistence, 
which provided guidelines for supporting foreign residents at the local municipal 
level (Lee 2010). One noteworthy characteristic of the multicultural coexistence 
policy is that it is led by local governments where foreigners are concentrated and 
the central government’s involvement is weak and limited. Most programs at the 
local level aim at assisting foreigners to adapt to Japanese society and culture. How-
ever, the central government has not shown strong leadership to reform immigra-
tion policy and educate the general public to change their nationalistic ideas and 
attitudes (Akaha 2010; Yamanaka 2010).
Because of the long presence of indigenous people and four major ethnic groups 
in Taiwan, multiculturalism discourse and policy have taken off earlier in Taiwan 
than Japan and Korea. The four major ethnic groups include Taiwanese aborigines, 
the mainlanders, the Hakkas and the Fulos whose ancestors emigrated from Fujian 
province in the south-eastern part of China (Wang 2003). When the Kuomintang 
(KMT) ruled Taiwan in an authoritarian manner and Chinese nationalism domi-
nated national identity and culture, multiculturalism was not a topic of public dis-
course and policy. From the 1970s to the 1980s, however, ‘Taiwanese conscious-
ness’ began to challenge Chinese culture and to look for unique Taiwanese culture 
and identity (Wang 2003). From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the aborigines began 
movements to recover land and the Hakka joined movements to regain language 
and name. To recognize and compensate for historical discrimination against ethnic 
minorities, the Taiwanese government issued a series of multiculturalism policies: 
1035 From a Migrant Integration of Distinction to a Multiculturalism of Inclusion
“Community Renaissance,” “Multicultural Taiwan,” and “Cultural Citizenship” 
(Wang 2007 as cited in Kim and Oh 2012). Also, in 1997, it revised the Taiwanese 
Constitution to redefine the identity of Taiwan as a multicultural nation and granted 
civic, linguistic, and cultural rights to aboriginals (Kim and Oh 2012). The govern-
ment also legislated a series of laws including the Aboriginal Education Act, the 
Aboriginal Development Act, the Draft of the Aboriginal Self-Government Act, and 
the establishment of the Committee for Aboriginal Affairs (Wang 2007). Moreover, 
the Taiwanese policy of Cultural Citizenship is recognized as the first one in East 
Asia that aims to instill democratic multiculturalism through the acknowledgment 
and expansion of cultural rights (Kim and Oh 2012). However, this policy is criti-
cized for emphasizing cultural unity while ignoring the cultures of ethnic minority 
groups such as the Hakka and aborigines.
Taiwan’s multiculturalism policy met a new challenge in the 1990s onward when 
the immigration of migrant workers, foreign brides, and Chinese brides increased 
ethnic diversity and complicated social membership. Taiwan began to admit foreign 
migrant workers and marriage migrants in the 1980s. There were 417,385 migrant 
workers and 404,142 marriage migrants in 2008. Migrant workers accounted for 
about 3.0 % of the Taiwan’s labor force and marriage migrants constituted 25 % 
of all marriages in 2008. In that sense, the impact of international migration on 
the economy and society should be greater in Taiwan than Korea. Like its Korean 
counterparts, migrant workers in Taiwan are reported to suffer serious violations 
of human and labor rights, such as expensive referral fees, deduction of security 
deposit from salary, no or limited days off, ban on change of business or workplace, 
and sexual harassment, in the case of domestic or care workers (Cheng 2003). Fe-
male marriage migrants, especially from Asia’s developing countries and mainland 
China, are subject to prejudice and stereotypes and children of these women have 
disadvantages at schools and in society (Tseng 2008). Like other East Asian coun-
terparts, Taiwan still restricts citizenship to its nationals and is unwilling to grant 
multicultural rights and citizenship to immigrants like migrant workers.
Korea accepted multiculturalism discourse and policy with great enthusiasm. 
Given a small number of immigrants, especially a smaller number of permanent 
residents, the enthusiasm for multiculturalism that Korean people have shown so far 
is quite surprising and unusual. The drive behind the multiculturalism fad was pos-
sible because it was thought to be politically correct and was regarded as synonym 
for globalization and advancement, a step toward joining the ranks of advanced 
nations (Seol 2009).
Many actors allied with each other to convince the general public that a multicul-
tural society is inevitable and ethnic and cultural diversity is an asset of creativity that 
would enhance national vitality and competitiveness (Yoon 2010). Korean scholars 
introduced theories and discourses of multiculturalism developed in Western so-
cieties to examine current situations and problems of various types of migrants. 
Civic organizations advocated the rights of migrant workers and marriage migrants 
and supported their adjustment in Korea. Mass media transformed migrants’ prob-
lems into a social issue and raised public awareness of the difficulties faced by 
migrants. The Korean government took proactive measures to  accommodate the 
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needs of foreigners and migrants. Although it acted rather too quickly and hastily, 
the central government and its affiliated organizations have made some remark-
able accomplishments in immigration and multiculturalism policies. These include 
(1) the establishment of the Employment Permit System and Healthy Family Sup-
port Centers, (2) legislation of the Foreigners Treatment Act and the Multicultural 
Family Support Act, and (3) establishment of legal and institutional infrastructures 
like the Korea Immigration Service. Also, according to many surveys on Koreans’ 
perceptions of migrant workers and multicultural society, Koreans seem to have 
much more open-minded and positive viewpoints toward migrant workers, mar-
riage migrants, and a multicultural society than ever before, and their perspectives 
are slowly but gradually changing more positively (Yoon et al. 2010; Yoon and 
Song 2011).
The Korean approach to multiculturalism has several distinctive characteris-
tics. First, multiculturalism and migrant integration are not clearly distinguished, 
and terms such as multicultural policy, multiculturalism policy, foreign policy, and 
immigration policy are often used almost synonymously and interchangeably. Al-
though multiculturalism policy and migrant integration policy have some overlaps, 
the former is distinguished from the latter in its emphasis on the recognition of 
a minority group’s rights to maintain cultural and religious practices (Wright and 
Bloemraad 2012, p. 78). When we examine closely the Korean government’s poli-
cies and programs regarding immigrants, most of them are about assisting immi-
grants to adapt to Korean society with little attention to cultural rights (Kim 2010). 
Nonetheless, such types of policies and programs are often regarded as multicultur-
alism policy, and this confusion prompted some critical Korean researchers to call 
the Korean government’s policy as “multiculturalism in appearance only” (Kim 
2007). There is no official multiculturalism policy explicitly stated by the Korean 
government and currently, the official names of similar policies are foreigner policy 
and immigration policy. However, many ministries of the central government and 
local governments as well as civic organizations carry out a variety of migrant in-
tegration programs in the name of multiculturalism, because this policy is largely 
viewed in Korean society as popular and politically correct.
Second, the main targets or beneficiaries of the government’s migrant integration 
policy are people in international marriages and their children. Koreans coined a 
new term for these people, the multicultural family, to avoid negative connotations 
associated with international marriages between American military servicemen and 
Korean women and children of international marriages (e.g., mixed-blood people). 
Migrant workers, who account for a larger share of immigrants in Korea, are not 
considered a major clientele of migrant integration programs. Ethnic Chinese, who 
have lived in Korean soil for many generations, are not even considered as a rel-
evant target group that the government needs to take care of.
Third, most migrant integration policies and programs aim at assimilating im-
migrants to Korean culture and society rather than accepting cultures and identities 
of immigrant groups. Korean language education, Korean culture learning, coun-
seling, and vocational training are the backbone of migrant integration programs. 
Some civic organizations, like the Women Migrants Human Rights Center, run a 
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Vietnamese language program for the Korean husbands of Vietnamese female mar-
riage migrants, but such cultural program is very rare. Also, although multicultural-
ism is officially adopted as a goal of Korean public education and more efforts are 
put in to enhance multicultural acceptance among the general public, multicultural 
education is still interpreted as helping immigrant children adapt to the Korean 
school environment.
Fourth, the Korean people and society as a whole are pretty sympathetic toward 
immigrants, especially toward female marriage migrants and their children. Be-
cause of the general public’s positive and benevolent attitudes toward immigrants, 
the Korean government allocated a generous budget for migrant integration pro-
grams. This phenomenon, called “paternalist policy” and “tolerance paradigm” 
(Shim 2007), is largely due to a small number of immigrants and their weak influ-
ence on Korean society and culture. Thus, immigrants do not pose any threat or 
challenge to the dominant group’s status quo and way of life, making the Korean 
people tolerant of them. In addition, as mentioned earlier, Koreans recognize their 
historical wrongdoings toward ethnic minorities, especially the ethnic Chinese and 
children of international marriages, and thus view multiculturalism as a liberal dem-
ocratic way of coexistence in the global era.
The last point relates to what I want to elaborate on in the next section. Because 
immigrants and ethnic minorities are not numerous, are non-threatening and had 
arrived in Korea at different time periods, the Korean society responded to each 
group in a separate manner. While their number was still small and the economic 
burden was negligible, such a piecemeal approach was not a problem. However, as 
their number increases and their presence starts to feel burdensome, a new approach 
needs to be designed to restore fairness and efficiency.
5.2  A Migrant Integration of Distinction
As a result of the sudden rise in immigration since the late 1980s, Korea now has a 
number of multicultural minority groups. In this context, a multicultural minority 
group is defined as a group of people whose race, ethnicity, nationality, or culture 
are more salient markers than sex, age, sexual orientation, or region when defining 
him or her as a minority. At present, migrant workers, marriage migrants, children 
of international marriages, overseas Chinese (華僑), overseas Koreans living in 
Korea, and North Korean migrants are the most representative multicultural mi-
nority groups in the country. Koreans have different perceptions and grant differ-
ent statuses and privileges to each of these groups according to their nationality, 
compatriot status, and legal status (Yoon 2010). Figure 5.1 shows the position of 
multicultural minority groups arranged along the dimensions of nationality, com-
patriot status, and legal status. North Korean defectors belong to the right upper 
part, where Korean nationality and compatriot status fit in together, and therefore 
they get special treatment for they are Korean in blood and expected to play impor-
tant roles in the process of unification. In the right lower part, where non-Korean 
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 nationality and compatriot status fit in together, ethnic Koreans in China, Russia, 
and other overseas Koreans are located. Here, though they are not Korean nationals, 
they are given extra care and attention often based on brotherly or fraternal love. At 
the left upper part, where Korean nationality and non-compatriot status overlap, are 
the naturalized-marriage migrants. They have acquired Korean nationality through 
marriage and are expected to continue family lineage by giving birth to the next 
generation. These marriage migrants and their Korean husbands form multicultural 
families, and their children—who are full citizens—also receive special attention 
and support, especially in education. Last but not least, at the left lower part, where 
non-Korean nationality and non-compatriot status overlap, are the ethnic Chinese 
in Korea and the migrant workers. Although the ethnic Chinese have been perma-
nent residents in Korea for several generations, they are treated as ‘half-citizens’ 
(Kim 2006). Since foreign migrant workers are non-citizens, non-Koreans by blood 
and are only temporary residents in Korea, they receive much less attention, and 
this is further divided based on their legal status. Legal migrant workers are pro-
tected through the Foreign Workers Employment Law and Foreigners Treatment 
Act, while illegal (or undocumented) migrant workers are excluded from any form 
of legal protection, and are therefore put in a difficult situation.
The Korean government is no different from the Korean people in its relationship 
to each multicultural minority group. In response to a sudden rise in immigrants and 
diverse immigration-related problems since the late 1980s, the Korean government 
offered a number of countermeasures. In each instance, it tried to establish ministry-
centered migrant integration policies for each specific case. Its case-by-case pattern 
of response is quite visible in its policies for protecting the human rights and sup-
porting the social adaptation of multicultural minority groups. For example, the 
government enacted the North Korean Defectors Welfare and Resettlement Act in 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? •?????????????????????•??????????????????????????????????•????????????????•?????????????????????????????• ??????????????• ??????????????????????
• ???????????????????????????? ??
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????? ????? ???
Figure 5.1 Koreans’ cognitive schema of immigrants
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1997, the Overseas Koreans Immigration and Legal Status Law in 1999, the For-
eigners Treatment Act in 2007, and Multicultural Family Support Act in 2008 to ad-
dress one by one the problems of domestic adaptation and social integration of each 
migrant group. However, these laws distinguished foreigners and migrants from 
ordinary citizens and approached each migrant group separately by enacting special 
laws for each group. On the other hand, it failed to take a comprehensive approach, 
such as the legislation of the Anti-Discrimination Act, to extend equal treatment to 
all minority groups.
Another effect of enacting policies according to individual ministries was the 
awkward advent of a classification phase wherein each multicultural minority group 
was differentiated from the others. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
specified female marriage migrants and their children as the beneficiaries of that 
ministry’s policies. Likewise, the Ministry of Unification identified North Korean 
defectors, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade earmarks overseas Ko-
reans as the targets of their respective ministries’ policies. As a result, rather than 
simultaneously enacting support measures for identical recipients, each policy was 
deliberated across agencies, leading to the recurring problem of redundantly invest-
ing material and human resources into similar programs and policies, each under a 
separate support regimen.
Moreover, lines were not only drawn by government ministries, but also by mi-
grants themselves. Each separate migrant group highlighted their special qualities, 
distinguished themselves from other groups, and demanded special treatment and 
privileges from the Korean government and society. Chinese Koreans tried to high-
light their shared ethnicity with Korean citizens and their special identities as the 
descendants of independence movement activists during the Japanese occupation 
of the Korean peninsula. To this end, they dislike being regarded on equal terms 
as foreign migrant workers and female marriage migrants. North Korean defectors 
also share an obvious kinship with South Koreans and claim special treatment on 
the grounds that they are forerunners of future North-South Unification. They argue 
that their successful adaptation in South Korea is a litmus test of South Korea’s abil-
ity to achieve social integration after unification. In particular, civic organizations 
and the Ministry of Unification, the agency responsible for North Korean defector 
policy, seem to oppose viewing North Korean defectors from the perspective of 
multiculturalism. Female marriage migrants become the wives, daughters-in-law, 
and mothers of Korean citizens, roles recognized as essential for the reproduction 
of families. Proactive government support is provided to these individuals in order 
to aid their rapid assimilation as Koreans. Meanwhile, foreign migrant workers are 
given only the most basic considerations for human rights protection and are oth-
erwise excluded from social integration policies because they are only perceived 
as being temporary migrants. Moreover, legal foreigners receive governmental 
protection and the guarantee of equal rights as Korean citizens under the Foreign-
ers Treatment Act legislated in 2006; however, undocumented foreigners and their 
children are situated in a blind spot in terms of human rights. Accordingly, rather 
than recognizing multicultural minority groups in Korea as a unified minority, their 
distinctions are highlighted, and they are unable to unite and respond collectively to 
the social discrimination and exclusionary structures that constrain them.
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The government’s policy of migrant integration does not integrate migrants into 
prior administrative and welfare systems but supports them by providing separate 
laws, programs, budgets, human resources, and facilities thereby giving rise to 
wasteful, overlapping investments. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
claims to provide services to female marriage migrants that are customized to their 
life cycle. The question is, once an immigrant acquires citizenship, until what point 
should the government support them. Similarly, it is also necessary to consider up 
to what point the government ought to protect and support North Korean defec-
tors. Regarding the overlapping investments of budgets and facilities, the Ministry 
of Unification operates 31 settlement support centers for North Korean defectors 
(called Hana Centers, meaning “We are One” Centers) and the Ministry of Gender 
Equality operates 200 multicultural family support centers nationwide. In metro-
politan areas across the country, institutions under various names, such as foreigner 
human resource centers, foreign worker support centers, and foreign laborer support 
centers, are all supporting foreign migrant workers. Korea’s approach to migrants 
is quite different from that of Japan where autonomous local governments operate 
multicultural coexistence programs, and they do not distinguish between foreigners 
and locals. Instead, they recognize all participants as local residents and provide 
equal services (Moon 2012, pp. 23–24; Table 5.1).
Migrant integration policy of distinction has not only created fissures among 
migrants, but has also amplified prejudices and stereotypes, even antagonism and 
conflict among migrants and locals. Cries of reverse discrimination against locals 
grow daily as government support for migrant groups is deemed excessive com-
pared to the support provided to marginal groups among ordinary citizens such as 
the low-income class, single-parent families, and the disabled. Backlash of this type 
is increasingly prevalent in “contact zones,” such as tenement housing areas, where 
migrants and locals live in rather dense proximity to one another.
In the past, the problem of reverse discrimination of locals was raised primarily 
by anti-multicultural movement actors, but now, the issue has received so much 
criticism from civil activists concerned about the cost-free childcare for the children 
of multicultural families that the problem can no longer be ignored.
Given all of the issues raised above, it is clear that at this point, it will be difficult 
to obtain the consent of ordinary citizens and to continue operating special group-
specific policies. Thus, in the future, government support ought to be provided to 
people equally, not according to their particular background and identity, but accord-
ing to their needs as determined by universal standards such as social class and risk 
factors (familial dissolution, sickness, and unemployment). If universal standards 
are applied, then support will be available not only to those minority groups with 
a migrant background, such as North Korean defectors and multicultural families, 
but also to local citizens such as low-income households, single-parent families, the 
disabled, and so on. This will have the effect of alleviating reverse discrimination 
and controversies over fairness. When citizens believe that they, too, can receive 
government support when they fall upon hard times, they will be less stingy about 
providing support to migrants who are in the initial stages of resettlement. Naturally, 
with the expansion of policy beneficiaries comes the problem of securing a budget. 
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Ministry Policy targets Policy domain Main points of policy
Ministry of Justice Immigrants Immigration, 
citizenship
Coordinate foreigner 
policies
Social integration of 
migrants, social 
order of foreign 
residents
Refugee policies, 
overseas Koreans 
policies, permanent 
resident and natural-
ization policies
Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and 
Commerce
Overseas Koreans, etc Support of overseas 
Koreans
Issue visas, overseas 
Koreans policies
Ministry of Labor Foreign migrant 
workers
Employment Permission to employ 
foreign workers
Employment support 
for foreign workers
Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family
Multicultural families Multicultural family 
and gender equality; 
women’s civil rights
Advance civil rights 
and welfare of 
migrant women
Support social adjust-
ment of female mar-
riage immigrants 
and multicultural 
families
Ministry of Culture, 
Sports, and Tourism
Ordinary citizens Culture, sports, arts, 
tourism
Promote social 
awareness about 
multiculturalism
Support cultural and 
linguistic adjust-
ment of migrants
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry, and Energy
Foreign investors Investments Support foreign 
investors
Ministry of Secu-
rity and Public 
Administration
Foreign Residents 
(marriage migrants, 
foreign workers, 
international stu-
dents, etc)
Local administra-
tion and Resident 
management
Support for the local 
resettlement and 
participation of 
migrants
Build implementing 
system of multicul-
turalism policy at 
the local govern-
ment level
Table 5.1 General content of Korea’s migrant integration policy by ministry.(Source: Lee (2012)) 
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However, as policy targets are universalized according to the inclusive principle of 
social integration and the actual number of support recipients gradually expand, this 
will also reduce reverse discrimination and disputes over fairness.
5.3  Toward a Multiculturalism of Inclusion
As seen in the experiences of the West and Korea, which have specific govern-
ment policies targeting a specific immigrant and minority groups, it is difficult to 
garner the general public’s support and to bring out sustainable policies because of 
controversies over fairness. Therefore, government support must be provided in 
accordance with universal standards like social class, not by special statuses. If the 
general public is able to receive the government’s support when facing difficulties, 
it would not be as opposed to supporting immigrants in the early settlement stage. 
Expanding the policy targets in this way would definitely cause a budget problem, 
yet the problem of reverse discrimination can be resolved if such policy targets are 
universalized theoretically and supporting targets are augmented gradually.
Legislating separate laws for specific multicultural minority groups is not only 
complicated and ineffective but also creates conflict and division among different 
minority groups, on one hand, and migrants and natives, on the other. From the 
experience of advanced countries that practice multiculturalism, it is evident that 
the minimum and most basic condition of multiculturalism is to abolish all kinds of 
discrimination and social exclusion. Unfortunately, Korea does not have a compre-
hensive anti-discrimination law yet. It has a series of separate anti-discrimination 
laws for people with disabilities, women, and the elderly, but it has failed to achieve 
general consensus on the issue of prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, nationality, religion, and sexual orientation. Legislating a comprehensive 
and universal anti-discrimination law is a first step towards a multiculturalism of 
inclusion.
Ministry Policy targets Policy domain Main points of policy
Ministry of Educa-
tion, Science, and 
Technology
Children of multi-
cultural family, 
immigrant children, 
native students, 
teachers, etc
Development of 
educational human 
resources
Support education for 
children of multi-
cultural families
Lifelong educa-
tion programs for 
marginalized classes 
(including multicul-
tural families)
Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Food and Rural 
Affairs
Female migrants resid-
ing in rural areas
Educational training 
for female migrant 
farmers
Provide customized 
agribusiness educa-
tion for female 
migrant farmers
Table 5.1 (continued) 
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Korean ministries have created and managed separate systems and facilities for 
multicultural minority groups. This practice has created problems of overlapping 
support for certain groups and sparked accusations of reverse discrimination against 
lower-classes of native Koreans. Although separate systems and facilities might be 
essential at an early settlement stage, integrating them into the existing welfare ad-
ministration system after a certain period is a more efficient use of budget and labor 
force. It can also remove concerns of excessive support for certain migrant groups 
and reverse discrimination against locals.
Finally, we need to develop a new principle of social solidarity and integra-
tion suitable for a multicultural society. As explained earlier, relationships between 
Koreans and multicultural minority groups are determined largely by whether they 
are Korean nationals or not, compatriots or not, and foreigners with legal status or 
not. Naturalized international marriage migrants and their children are regarded as 
Korean nationals; Overseas Koreans are regarded as compatriots; while regard for 
foreigners and migrant workers differs according to the legality of their stay in Ko-
rea. Naturalized marriage migrants and their children become the target of inclusion 
and assimilation. Overseas Koreans receive preferential treatment over non-Korean 
foreigners. Foreigners staying in Korea legally are protected from discrimination 
and receive support for social adjustment and economic activities while illegal or 
undocumented ones are excluded from social support and protection.
These group-specific principles are inconsistent and are often viewed as dis-
criminatory and thus not appropriate to become the principle of coexistence among 
peoples of different cultural backgrounds in a multicultural society. Thus, there is 
a need for a more universal and inclusive principle of social integration that can be 
applied to all actual members of a multicultural society.
Ethnicity and ethnic nationalism used to be the principle of social solidarity and 
the driving force that united Koreans in times of national crises. It is no longer valid 
in recent times, however, when territory, ethnicity, culture, and nationality do not 
coincide (Befu 2001). Nationality (or citizenship) and civic nationalism are more 
effective than ethnicity and ethnic nationalism to incorporate naturalized foreign-
ers, such as marriage migrants and their children, into South Korean society. They 
are not, however, applicable to overseas Chinese who are permanent members of 
Korean society and other sojourning foreigners. Moreover, undocumented foreign-
ers who constitute a sizable portion of the foreign population, do not receive basic 
protection of their human rights because Korean laws, like the Foreigners Treat-
ment Act and the Ordinance to Support Resident Aliens, protect only foreigners 
with legal status in the country.
In order to acknowledge all actual members of a multicultural society and to 
provide them with minimum protection of human rights, I propose the adoption of 
the principle of residence and cohabitation as the principle of multicultural coexis-
tence. By the principle of residence and cohabitation, foreigners and migrants are 
acknowledged as residents and people living in local communities and are entitled 
to basic human rights regardless of legal status. All multicultural minority group 
members are cohabitants with local Koreans, sharing residence in the same com-
munities and having interdependent relationships. The concept of cohabitation is 
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similar to the concept of denizenship proposed by Soysal (1994). Soysal argues that 
the restructure of citizenship from particularistic national to universalistic postna-
tional citizenship has its roots in the post-WWII period when a new legal arrange-
ment, also called denizenship, came into being for labor migrants and guestworkers. 
Guestworkers in Germany and France, who have resided in countries for years, 
have obtained civil and social rights, regardless of their nationality. It is true that 
denizenship does not allow political participation, and therefore represents a legal 
status to be located between being alien and being a citizen (Joppke 2010, p. 33). 
However, it can still provide long-term aliens with social rights and opportunities to 
participate as productive members of the host society and to work, as a rational tran-
sitional procedure of normalizing the status of long-term aliens by naturalization. 
In that sense, cohabitation and denizenship can work as middle-range principles 
of multicultural coexistence before Koreans, still imbued with strong nationalism, 
adopt universalistic postnational citizenship.
5.4  Theoretical Discussions
The examination of Korea’s situation of multiculturalism provides several topics 
for theoretical discussion. One is whether multiculturalism is valid for Korea or not. 
The second is the relationship between civic integration and multiculturalism. The 
third is the position or status of the dominant group in multiculturalism discourse 
and policy.
Regarding the first issue, as already mentioned, the proportions of immigrants in 
Korea (likewise Japan and Taiwan), including the short-term and permanent resi-
dents, do not exceed three percent of the total population. The proportion of per-
manent resident foreigners is below one percent. Integration is not an important 
element of the policy because most foreigners are short-stay, low-skilled workers 
expected to return to their homeland once the contract period is over. If multicultur-
alism is limited to the social and cultural rights of immigrants and ethnic minorities 
with guaranteed citizenship, it may be irrelevant and invalid for countries like Ko-
rea with a small number and a low percentage of foreign permanent residents and 
indigenous peoples. Moreover, it may be counterproductive to implement social 
integration programs in countries like Korea where ethnic and cultural homogene-
ity used to contribute to national solidarity and mobilization. Europeans may find 
it difficult to understand why the Korean government and Koreans have interest 
in multiculturalism when it is regarded as a failed social policy in many European 
countries.
We have to note, however, the fact that Korea was ethnically and culturally ho-
mogenous in the past but is quickly transforming into a multiethnic, multicultural 
society due to the increase of international migration since the 1980s. The number 
of foreigners in 2012 reached 1,445,103, about 1.9 times higher compared to the 
2000 figure of 491,324, and it is projected that the proportion of foreigners will 
increase to 9.2 % of the population by 2050. As society is becoming more  pluralistic 
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and complicated, we need a new principle of social solidarity and cohesion by which 
diverse ethnic and cultural communities can coexist. Also, we need to develop a 
social policy to aid immigrants and ethnic minorities to integrate into mainstream 
society more effectively so that they can become full and productive members of 
society. In this context, multiculturalism can function as one of the principles in 
which diverse cultural communities can coexist.
Parekh (2006) described multiculturalism as a perspective of human life differ-
ent from a political doctrine accompanied by a specific program and a philosophical 
theory about humanity and the world. He also said the theory of multiculturalism is 
not about the minorities, but about an appropriate relationship among multicultural 
communities. This interpretation of multiculturalism is a comprehensive viewpoint 
in which multiculturalism is not confined to particular minorities, specific coun-
tries, or the Western context, but can be universally applied. Pursuing culture-ori-
ented multiculturalism could relieve tension resulting from the historical context of 
residents and immigrants. Regardless of the historical and numerical proportions, 
‘those’ possessing different culture from our own are our counterparts for ‘mutual 
communication,’ who enable us to have a new understanding of our customs and 
traditions, to look back, and to transcend them. In this case, multiculturalism is a 
discourse about the proper relationship between entities pursuing mutual communi-
cation based on respective cultures.
Originally, multiculturalism did not simply refer to cultural diversity based only 
on racial and ethnic differences, but became overly racial or ethnic in Western Eu-
rope and Korea. In particular, multiculturalism in Korea exhibited a labeling effect 
that often restricts the discussion to female marriage migrants and their children. 
This kind of interpretation seriously distorts the meaning of multiculturalism. Mul-
ticulturalism is a set of principles and practices to acknowledge and value cultural 
diversity arising from differences in various dimensions encompassing religion, re-
gion, gender, age, and gender identity as well as race and ethnicity. Korean society 
is expected to transform into a hyper-pluralistic society in which conflict and op-
position between social groups are intensified by the traditional dimensions such as 
classes, regions, genders, generations, and ideologies, as well as race, ethnicity, age 
and religion. It is the Korean society’s important mission to investigate the aspect 
of fracture and conflict between social groups in a pluralistic society and to develop 
the principles of coexistence and cohesion as well as action plans for diversity man-
agement.
Another reason why multiculturalism is valid as well as useful for Korea is be-
cause it can foster democracy and help democratic values and behaviors to be prac-
ticed in everyday life. As we know, East Asian countries including Korea have been 
strongly influenced by Confucianism that emphasizes hierarchy and conformity. 
The freedom of ordinary people has been severely suppressed and basic human 
rights of diverse minority groups and disadvantaged classes of people have been 
violated. Nationalism, communism, authoritarianism, and other kinds of ideology 
that demand conformity to group norms make it difficult for democracy to flourish. 
Recognition of and respect for diversity is one of pre-conditions of equality, and 
democracy is possible and can mature when people relate to each other as equal 
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beings. As Kymlicka (2010) points out, multiculturalism is about developing new 
models of democratic citizenship to replace uncivil and undemocratic relations of 
hierarchy and exclusion. Then, multiculturalism is more needed in less democratic 
societies than in already democratized societies to expedite the consolidation of 
democracy after the phase of transition to democracy.
The final reason why multiculturalism is needed in Korea is that it can enhance 
cultural diversity and creativity that would provide a new engine for national de-
velopment in the age of knowledge economy and creativity economy. Korea is 
well-known for high levels of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The belief in same-
ness and the tradition of centralized authoritarian rule gave birth to a phenomenon 
of strong group conformity. Koreans fear of being different from others and do 
not allow others to be different. Individual freedom, privacy, and creativity have 
been choked by pressure for group conformity. In order for Korea to flourish in the 
knowledge and creativity economy, Koreans need to develop more multicultural 
ability to appreciate cultural diversity and hybridity and utilize them for creativity 
and innovation.
Regarding the relationship between civic integration and multiculturalism, view-
ing multiculturalism solely as civic integration, such as the protection of human 
rights and the prohibition of discrimination, may overlook the importance of cul-
ture, which is a core of multiculturalism. In Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural 
Diversity and Political Theory, Bhikhu Parekh (2006) describes ‘cultural diversity’ 
as the essence of multiculturalism and develops an in-depth discussion on this mat-
ter. Culture has led to an insight that mutual dialogue between cultures is not nor-
matively ideal but ‘inevitable,’ since it is a mechanism that enriches the culture 
itself from its nature, in which it is originally fluid and has uncertain boundaries 
that change over time. Consequently, it insists that not only the assimilation and 
conformity of minorities to the norms and values of the mainstream culture have to 
be bolstered, but it also endeavors to promote a consensus through mutual dialogue 
between minorities and majorities, and to develop a democratic and rational rela-
tionship that has to be adopted beforehand.
In addition to these philosophical arguments of Parekh, culture is psychologi-
cally a foundation of self and identity, and affection for one’s own culture and pride 
is natural. Even if civic rights are ensured and opportunities for a better social status 
are provided equally, it cannot be said that true freedom and happiness are being 
appreciated if one cannot use the native language and enjoy native culture. Hence, 
multicultural receptivity, which keeps the tradition of minorities intact, assures the 
right to enjoy and acknowledge each other’s culture separately from civic integra-
tion, and is a multicultural society’s basic requirement that can never be set aside.
The final topic of discussion, the position or status of the dominant group in 
multiculturalism discourse and policy, is what appears to separate interculturalism 
from multiculturalism. In his comparison of interculturalism and multiculturalism, 
Bouchard (2011) claims that multiculturalism operates in a ‘diversity’ paradigm 
where individuals and groups have equal status under the same law and there is 
“no recognition of a majority culture.” By contrast, interculturalism operates in a 
‘duality’ paradigm where “diversity is conceived and managed as a relationship 
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between immigrant minorities and a cultural majority that could be described as 
foundational” (Bouchard 2011, pp. 441–442).
I do not intend to join the debate between the two philosophies, but I just want 
to point out that even multiculturalism in many liberal democracies, like Canada 
and Australia, acknowledge the privileges of the dominant groups or foundational 
pillars of society. The 1968 Official Languages Act of Canada, for example, gives 
English and French preferred status over all other languages. Similarly, the 1989 
National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia acknowledges the importance of “our 
British heritage” in helping “to define us as Australian” (Levey 2012). Thus, as 
long as multiculturalism is sponsored and implemented by the state, it is taken for 
granted that the dominant culture is the core around which ethnic minority cultures 
are added, to increase diversity but not to alter the foundation. In this sense, the line 
between the two ideas of diversity management is overlapping.
If ethnic hierarchy is a sociological fact that we cannot ignore, acknowledging 
the prominent status of the dominant group and its culture is unavoidable. This does 
not mean, however, that the dominant group should have privileges over minor-
ity groups in power and other forms of scarce resources. All members of society 
should be treated equal before the law, regardless of their racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious backgrounds. Nonetheless, we need to recognize that the dominant group’s 
history, culture, and identity happen to form the basis of a nation’s culture and 
identity. If immigrants volunteer to join that nation, it is fair to say that they have al-
ready at least implicitly agreed to adopt the host society’s culture and identity. They 
can maintain their unique culture and identity in private realms, but as members of 
one common society, they need to share the common national identity and to fulfill 
civic duties and responsibilities. The status of the dominant group is particularly 
relevant in countries like Korea and Japan where ethnic minorities are so few and 
not influential. In such countries, claiming that every group and culture is equal 
is simply pretension and rhetoric. What is more constructive is to recognize that a 
given society was formed by the history and culture of the dominant group and that 
is the basis of social order. And then, we need to discern what is particularly ethnic 
and group-specific, and what is more civic and universal, and gradually build the 
basis of social membership and rights and privileges on more inclusive, universal, 
and democratic criteria. Such a gradual recognition and revision will make the tran-
sition to a multicultural society a robust and sustainable project.
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